ABSTRACT When numerous well-known suppliers and original equipment manufacturers engage in deceptive practices, including falsifying product data or neglecting to report known defects, the fundamental question that arises is whether any claim from any company can be trusted. This paper sheds light on the importance of tackling supply chain fraud more rigorously. This paper discusses the current state of supply chain complexity and customer practices and then highlights the prevalence of fraud and its impact on all consumers. Examples of renowned companies that have either publicly acknowledged fraudulent practices or were caught in some level of deception in their supply of products are provided. Examining the different instances of fraud enabled us to identify cost reduction as a conjoint recurring cause, which formed the baseline to develop and suggest guidelines for fraud detection and risk mitigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced that cars sold by Volkswagen in the United States emitted higher than allowed levels of environmentally harmful nitrogen oxide compounds [1] . Volkswagen, the world's second largest automaker at the time, denied the accusations for more than a year until confronted with evidence of its ''defeat software''. The software was able to detect when the vehicle was being tested rather than being driven, at which point it switched to ''dyno calibration mode'' to register emissions below the EPA compliance limit [2] . When tested without the defeat software activated, vehicles released up to 40 times more nitrogen oxide than the allowed limit [3] . Volkswagen admitted to the fraudulent activities, and has paid USD 2.8 billion in criminal fines and USD 1.5 billion to settle civil, environmental, customs, and financial violations 1 [7] . The Volkswagen example, however, is just one of many.
Clear, factual, and complete disclosure of product data is expected from every participant in a supply chain -from
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Bora Onat. 1 Numerous companies, including Audi [4] , Porsche [5] , Peugeot [6] , and more, have been subsequently caught implementing such ''cheating software'' in their cars to trick environmental regulation tests. materials, parts, and systems suppliers, 2 to manufacturers, assembly companies, and distributors [8] . For safety-critical components (such as those purchased for the commercial nuclear industry), such disclosure is often a requirement. 3 Unfortunately, fraudulent practices from well-established and previously respectable companies appear to be on the rise over the past 10 years, and it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for customers nowadays to trust their suppliers the way they might have in the past.
Per U.S. common law, the definition of fraud requires that a material or false statement be made with the intent to deceive another; that there is reasonable reliance on that statement by another person; and that damages result from that reliance [9] . When fraud is committed against consumers, they often lack the technical skills, legal understanding, and financial resources to detect, report, and seek damages from the responsible companies. In some cases, the government may become involved through oversight agencies such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and EPA. This oversight usually occurs only in situations where human safety has been breached, and when the action falls under the agencies' regulatory umbrella [10] - [12] . In other cases, class action lawsuits -in which the defendant is sued by a group of people with the same or similar injuries caused by the same product or action -can be brought against the fraudulent party, but the process is complex and time-consuming, and hence often discouraging [13] . Moreover, fraudulent practices appear to adapt to new regulations and legislationsjust as one scheme is discovered, another scheme takes its place [14] .
This paper focuses on companies that have committed, to some degree, fraudulent conduct, which runs the gamut from supplying sub-standard materials and parts, to providing misleading data or to falsifying data. Fraud is viewed from combined engineering, business, and legal perspectives. Examples spanning different industries were gathered and analyzed to understand the various reasons behind which companies are willing to risk their reputation and economic well-being by breaking the customers' trust.
The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness about the prevalence of fraud across numerous industries, emphasize the detriments associated with using fraudulent products, and propose mitigation plans to reduce the opportunities to commit fraud and ensure customers receive proper information and products. Section II presents a set of fraudulent incidents. Section III explores the reasons why companies commit fraud. Section IV tackles solutions for fraud avoidance and Section V gives the conclusions.
II. EXAMPLES OF FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
A variety of industries, including consumer electronics, medical, automotive, aerospace, as well as military, have been affected by fraud. Examples are provided below to highlight the types and range of fraudulent activities that have occurred over the past 10 years.
In 2006, lithium-ion batteries produced by Sony Energy Devices Corp. of Japan were reported to experience multiple failure incidents, including overheating and explosions [15] , [16] . The failures were caused by metal particle impurities introduced into the lithium-ion cell during crimping of the metal housing [17] . Sony batteries were used by various computer manufacturers, such as Gateway, Toshiba, and Dell. Sony was aware of the problem 10 months prior to the release of the battery into the market, but did not issue a recall at that time because of the lack of ''confirmation of incidents [involving fire]'', as announced by Sony spokesman Rick Clancy 4 [19] .
In 2008, Allen Bradley Corporation implemented an undocumented design change to their 700-RTC relay, whereby they replaced an obsolete analog device with a digital one (a complex programmable logic device -CPLD) in various nuclear power plants licensed by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The company did not change the part number of the relay, did not issue a product update or technical service bulletin, and did not indicate in the technical datasheet that a CPLD had been newly incorporated into the product. When powered, the CPLD generated an electromotive force that deteriorated the neighboring analog devices, resulting in the relay's failure 5 [20] .
By 2010, NHTSA had received thousands of complaints from Toyota customers about unexpected acceleration in their vehicles. Some of these problems were traced back to ''sticky'' car pedals, which were caused by the plastic material inside the pedals forcing the accelerator to become mechanically stuck in a partially depressed position. More than 80 deaths were linked to the sticky pedals problem, and the company hid the hazard from the public for 7 years 6 [21] .
In 2010, Fairchild shrank the semiconductor die size of their voltage regulator (part number KA7805ERTM), without altering the external package. As a result, it was forced to move the die to the package edge in order to properly wire bond, leading to an unbalanced packaged device. These changes were made without issuing a part change notification (PCN). Customers were unaware of the modifications, and continued using the parts in the customary operating conditions. The latent defect Fairchild created in its product resulted in a series of field failures that affected the reliability of various systems. Fairchild acknowledged the latent defect and eventually reverted to the previous, reliable design, yet again without issuing a PCN.
In April 2016, Mitsubishi Motors admitted that it had falsified fuel economy data for 50,000 vehicles sold in Japan [22] . The company acknowledged that the cars' fuel economy was up to 8.8% lower than what its own testing had previously revealed. To obtain more favorable fuel economy certifications for its cars, the company did not follow the standard method for calculating the fuel efficiency. Moreover, in 2000, the company's former president, Katsuhiko Kawasoe, admitted that customer complaints about certain automotive defects were concealed to avoid costly recalls 7 [23] . A subsidiary of Mitsubishi Motors, Mitsubishi Shindoh, also falsified data for some of its brass and copper products, used in automotive and electronics industries 8 [24] . In November 2017, Mitsubishi Cable Industries announced it had falsified data for its rubber O-ring sealants. The O-rings were used in aerospace, automotive, and nuclear applications to prevent fluid leaks. Between 5 Duke Energy, an authorized distributor of the part, was blamed by the NRC for not conducting adequate testing on the item prior to its installation into the nuclear plants. Duke Energy subsequently placed the Allen Bradley 700-RTC relay inventory on hold, set up a protocol to conduct sample inspection of incoming electronic items, and trained specialists to perform additional inspections of electrical items to identify potential unauthorized digital devices. 6 Toyota recalled a total of 9.3 million cars worldwide and was fined by the U.S. Department of Justice USD 1.2 billion. 7 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. suspended the sales of eight car models in Japan, and the company incurred a net loss of USD 1.2 billion within one day in 2016. 8 Mitsubishi Shindoh suspended the delivery of non-conforming products and ran an internal investigation to analyze safety and reliability issues. VOLUME 7, 2019 April 2015 and September 2017, the company had presented false data on over 270 million O-rings sold to 229 of its customers [25] .
In November 2016, the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) announced that Chinese machining supplier named Suzhou New Hongji Precision Parts Co. Ltd. (NHJ) had sold poorly made parts to Moog, a U.S.-based maker of flight control systems. NHJ had also issued fake certificates and outsourced work to a factory that Moog had not approved. More than 250 affected parts were installed in Boeing 777 wing spoilers [26] . NHJ had also been caught falsifying material certifications and using fake material by its previous aerospace customer, B/E Aerospace, which is an incident Moog was aware of [27] . In August 2015, the Supplier Quality Lead Ms. Claire Starzak reported that NHJ also attempted to create a fake certification for Moog, which did not prevent the company from re-approving NHJ for its supplier base in October 2015 [28] .
Between September 2016 and August 2017, all four of Kobe Steel's aluminum plants falsified product data. In October 2017, Kobe Steel acknowledged that it had falsified property data (i.e., strength and durability) for various aluminum and copper products used in cars, trains, and airplanes [29] , as well as in an H-IIA rocket manufactured by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK) that, fortuitously, had launched without incident [30] . More than 500 companies, including Boeing, Airbus, Toyota, and Nissan, relied on Kobe Steel products' quality. Even more troubling, Kobe Steel's executive vice president, Naoto Umehara, reported that some data had been fabricated for 10 years 9 [31] .
By 2017, the Japanese company, Takata Corporation, had produced more than 65 million defective automobile airbag units that were integrated into vehicles produced by 34 car companies [32] . More than 20 deaths and 240 injuries were traced back worldwide to the defective airbags. Court documents have shown that Takata knew that certain inflators failed during testing, but nonetheless sold the product to their customers, presented false reports, and concealed the true condition of the inflators [33] . Even after the public disclosure of Takata's airbag defects, Ford sought to downplay the problem in 2017 and avoid a recall by falsely 10 claiming that 360 dissections of their vehicle inflators demonstrated ''consistent inflator output performance'' 11 [34] . 9 Kobe Steel CEO Hiroya Kawasaki resigned in April 2018. The company's share prices declined by 40%. The company's American unit, Kobe Steel USA, is being scrutinized by the U.S. Department of Justice. 10 Takata's airbags contained phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate (PSAN), which was proven by researchers at Pennsylvania State University's High Pressure Combustion Laboratory to be susceptible to dynamic burning. PSAN in airbags must be used with extreme precision and care, and Takata had lax quality control. Additionally, the usage of calcium sulfate does not guarantee that the inflator would not rupture, because it only absorbs 10% of its weight in water vapor. Hence the experiments that Ford has conducted on the Takata airbags do not guarantee safety, unlike what the company claimed.
11 Takata recalled 3.3 million affected vehicles and filed for bankruptcy in Japan and the U.S. in 2017. The U.S. Department of Justice fined the company USD 1 billion.
In 2017, Nissan Motor Company was caught using uncertified technicians to conduct vehicle inspections. The incident was discovered by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport through documents purporting to show that final vehicle inspections and certifications were completed by Nissan personnel when, in fact, they were not certified to perform those tasks [35] . Furthermore, on October 2, 2017, Nissan's chief executive, Hiroto Saikawa, confirmed that since September 20, 2017, only certified technicians were conducting the inspections. However, other official sources disclosed that uncertified technicians had been employed until as recently as October 11, 2017 12 [36] .
In December 2017, phone users discovered that Apple was intentionally slowing the performance of iPhone 6, 6S, SE, and 7 smartphones to avoid sudden shutdowns resulting from degraded batteries. Apple updated their software in a way that reduced phone performance, but without informing their customers [37] . As a result, many customers unnecessarily purchased replacement phones. 13 In 2018, Toyota dealer Roger Hogan uncovered that Toyota neglected to fix the Prius car model's problems associated with the overheating of an inverter due to wearout. Hogan said that his dealership still received car models with damaged inverters even after a completed recall, and that clients were complaining about their cars' ''sluggishness'' after Toyota's fixes [40] . It was found that instead of replacing the inverters, which would have cost the company around USD 2,000 per part, Toyota had implemented a software update to reduce the battery usage, in an effort to diminish the usage stress on the inverter [41] . This ''quick fix'' resulted in a loss of power in the vehicles, reduced gas mileage, and increased emissions. Several class actions were subsequently filed against the company [42] .
Software fraud incidents have also been reported throughout the last decade. In May 2018, French car maker groups Renault and PSA Group (Peugeot S.A.) were caught using software named ''Partneo'', which artificially increased the price of their spare parts by an average of at least 15%. Through Partneo, some car components witnessed a price increase of 264% [43] . The software prices the spare parts based on how much a customer is willing to pay, rather than what the manufacturing cost and profit margins are. The software was developed by an expert in profit maximization, Laurent Boudout, and has been in use since 2006. The car makers have accrued benefits of at least USD 1 billion over the past decade. The incident was revealed by a French online newspaper Mediapart [44] , which had access to confidential documents that were analyzed by investigative journalists, European Investigative Collaborations (EIC). Lawsuits in 12 Nissan Motor Co Ltd. recalled 1.2 million cars sold in Japan that were inspected by the uncertified technicians. 13 Apple offered customers holding an iPhone 6 or later a battery replacement for USD 29 from January 2018 until December 2018, which was about USD 50 cheaper than the usual replacement cost, but still expensive [38] . The company suffered multiple class action suits files against it and was fined USD 11.4 million by the Italian court [39] .
France are currently filed against the original developer and car companies [45] .
The aforementioned are but a few examples of companies that have engaged in fraudulent activity and are summarized in Table 1 . In some cases, the details emerged only after the fraudulent activity was uncovered and publicly presented by independent customers, researchers and governmental body, rather than by the company's voluntary disclosure. We note that the complexity of current product development and manufacturing process has made it difficult to identify fraud before it infects a product and enters the stream of commerce, especially since products today can incorporate materials and parts from innumerable global supply chain partners.
III. WHY DO COMPANIES ENGAGE IN FRAUD?
While many factors contribute to fraudulent activities, we have identified three major classes of reasons: cost reduction programs, easily solvable technical challenges, and competitive pressures. These reasons often work together and thus may not be separable in all cases. Nevertheless, when one examines the case studies, one or more of these factors are present.
The tipping point, at which the interests for cost reduction overcome the imperative for quality, reliability, and safety, in the moment of decision making is not known, but becomes abundantly clear as field failures lead to costly recalls and litigation. By attempting to cut down on costs in an irresponsible manner, companies are paving their way to failure. When Toyota integrated an algorithm to reduce the usage of overheated inverters instead of replacing them, clearly the company did not account for the potential risks imposed by extending the usage of the overheated parts [41] . However, they did not account either for the fact that this short-term solution, will eventually drive the cost of recalls and replacements to exceed the costs incurred had they replaced the inverters from the beginning. In all of the examples that resulted in recalls, the financial and reputational struggle the companies had to go through as an aftermath of their malignance is significantly disproportionate to the effort they could have deployed to avoid fraud.
Reliability, amongst many elements in the product realization and sustainment processes, costs time and money, which can be saved, at least initially, by eliminating some reliability practices [46] . As noted in the examples given above, generating fake reports or neglecting to generate reports, are often easy ways to fix a reliability problem. When a company provides defective products, it means that it either has conducted an insufficient number of reliability tests, or ignored some or all of the defects detected by the tests that it did conduct. Both these cases form strong incentives to generate fake reports, or none at all. The Fairchild case exemplifies this practice; even though the company was not aware of their new voltage regulator being defective, it must still be held responsible for the subsequent field failures because it ignored reliability practices by not subjecting the modified part to the necessary tests. Allen Bradley also did not conduct reliability tests on their relay to avoid delaying the product release and additional expenses [20] .
Cost reductions can also encourage other fraudulent activities. For example, in the case of Nissan hiring uncertified technicians at lower labor rates, the workers had little to no expertise in reliability practices and standards, and were inadequately -if at all -trained to assess the safety of the vehicle [35] . Taking the risk of accepting products from a company that has a past history of generating fake reports [27] can only be incited by something as important to the company as saving a substantial amount of money. If companies incorporated life-cycle costs, including maintenance, warranty, recalls and litigation costs, perhaps different decisions regarding the allocation of resources would be made.
In the example of Kobe steel, the company was aware of certain defects in their products, but released them instead of discarding the defective lots, hoping that the defects would not lead to failure during the products' expected lifetime [31] . The cost reduction goal was to avoid incurring expenses associated with taking back the defective products and replacing them with defect-free ones. To that end, a company can ignore test results, change test and material property data, and modify software programs. In fact, this is the case with almost all examples presented in this paper; the companies hoped that the defects would pass undetected, or at least without severe consequences.
From a business standpoint, capital markets reward companies on a quarter-to-quarter basis (e.g., meeting earning expectations, stock performance, Price-to-Earnings ratios) [47] - [49] . Since executive compensation (and reputation) is tied to such performance criteria, there is little incentive to spend money to avoid problems over the long-term; instead, the decision-making focuses on short-term goals. In extreme cases, there exists an incentive to avoid reliability rules and practices to get the product to market quickly and to meet profit and schedule goals. The management's concern with its current reputation may also prevent it from announcing a product's recall.
While competition incentivizes innovation, it can prove a challenge to companies concerned with market share and cost. Tight competition between different companies imposes time and monetary constraints on the manufacturer. The need to develop products quickly can result in an end product having inadequate quality and reliability, since the rush to bring the next-generation product to market often requires a shortened design and test cycle. Reliability issues raised by the technical team may also be set aside; to ensure customer expectations for new products or updates are met, companies are often willing to compromise on the quality, reliability and safety of the product. Furthermore, the consuming public is now used to steady or even falling prices for goods and services in the developed economies, imposing lower price points of entry for the introduction of products to emerging markets [50] - [52] . This pushes companies to further drive down manufacturing costs by allocating less budget to quality assurance and reliability practices. As noted, another reason for fraudulent activities is associated with technical challenges and how they relate to the cost and schedule of supplying a product on time. In the case of Volkswagen, it was apparently a challenge for them to meet the mileage regulations in a timely manner without incurring extra costs. The company was forced to meet certain regulations and outperform or at least match their competitors, but due to the inability to accelerate product development, or the inability to do so in a sustainable way, they ended up falsifying information (such as performance output and test results). Volkswagen wanted to preserve its competitiveness by introducing the first ''green'' vehicle based on diesel engines. Yet, the company could not attain its technical goals, but chose to falsely advertise that it did. The inability to supply a product to meet certain technical requirements (e.g., redesigning a product to meet EPA requirements) can be an incentive to falsify data. This may have also been the case with Kobe Steel; they just could not produce the materials with the required material properties. On the other hand, it is also possible that they produced bad batches of inferior products and did not want to scrap the materials.
Companies tend to outsource part of their production when it is financially beneficial. Outsourcing is transferring a portion of activities and processes previously conducted internally (such as manufacturing) to an external party, which may be able to perform this task more cost-effectively [53] . Most companies are no longer vertically integrated, and more tasks are being performed by outside organizations, while the primary company concentrates on its primary business specialization and competency [54] . While this business model has resulted in global economic development, the process can impact product quality, reliability and safety, especially when outsourcing is conducted strictly for cost reduction purposes [55] . Factors such as learning curve, work culture, worker training and competency can result in lower quality, reliability and safety. In 2007, more than 5,300 pet food products were recalled in the U.S. and Canada after it was found that one of the key food ingredients (wheat gluten), the production of which was outsourced to a Chinese company, was contaminated [56] . Companies cannot conduct reliability tests on every product type received from each and every supplier. Instead, they rely on the quality and reliability reports presented by manufacturers. This increases the risk of integrating poorly made parts into a major system, thus increasing the probability of its failure.
The oligopolistic nature of certain industries can play a crucial role in fraud, especially when oligopolies measure supply chain success by reduced cost, forcing cuts in the quality and reliability of their products and services. With their market hegemony, these companies can ''make or break'' the companies in their supply chain [57] . For instance, in 2009, the Center for Advanced Life Cycle Engineering (CALCE) reported that Isola was selling defective laminates that resulted in the failure of avionics, medical, automotive, and military devices. In discussion with Isola's chief technology officer, CALCE learned that Isola purchased glass laminates from over 20 glass fabric companies, which in turn purchased glass fibers from numerous other companies that Isola admitted it was not privy to. The pressure for cost reduction on the supply chain members can negatively impact a product's development and assessment, and the final product manufacturer may be willfully ignorant of such problems. Even if the OEM is not pursuing cost reductions, it suffices for one of the suppliers to do so to end up with a product of lower quality and/or reliability. In oligopolies and in outsourcing setups, the companies may not be aware of the fraud festering at deeper levels of the supply chain.
The origin of fraud is increasingly hard to trace back due to the supply chain's complexity. Fraud can be committed by a third-or fourth-tier supplier. The making of a circuit board, for example, involves a highly sophisticated global supply chain. The laminates that form the base material of a circuit board require copper foil and prepregs/cores. The prepregs/cores are in turn made of glass fabric, resin, and additives (such as flame retardants), each of which might be supplied by independent parties. Any of the companies in the supply chain can be engaged in fraud.
The major driver of all the listed fraudulent activities boils down to the view of many companies that their current profits (market goals) are more important than the life cycle sustainment of the product. Fraud provides a way of achieving this. Although this near-sighted view does result in higher immediate profits, over the long run, more often than not, it results in higher losses due to recalls, litigation and a sullied brand names. In the age of self-certification, it becomes even more imperative that companies do not engage in fraud.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Even though legislative measures against fraud have been enacted in the U.S. and in other countries, they have proved to be unsuccessful in eliminating or even reducing fraudulent activities. This section first presents a legal overview of the current statutes and laws in the U.S. that were enacted to protect consumers from fraud, with examples of fines and punishment meted out in some of the cases described in this paper. The remainder of the section focuses on measures that could be employed to prevent or reduce fraudulent activities. Efforts from various parties are required in these measures, hence we firstly propose solutions that can be implemented by the government, then move on to ones that can be implemented by organizations, and finally ones that need to be undertaken by consumers themselves.
There are examples of legal and administrative actions against fraud and in most cases, they occur after the act [58] . In the case of Kobe, the Japanese government required the company to pay USD 1.1 billion to the companies affected by its misconduct [59] . Volkswagen had to pay the U.S. government a USD 2.8 billion criminal fine for manipulating its vehicles' emissions data [60] . Takata has also agreed to pay the U.S. government USD 1 billion in criminal penalties for selling defective airbags; USD 975 million in restitution for individuals injured by the defective airbags; and a USD 25 million fine [32] .
Fines, penalties, and financial losses can also extend beyond the final perpetrator and ensnare other members of the supply chain. For instance, in the Volkswagen matter, Bosch supplied the electric diesel control unit and software, which were integrated into the cars. While accusations have been directed at Bosch for deliberately programming the control VOLUME 7, 2019 unit to trick the EPA tests [61] , Bosch had not been held liable in court proceedings. Nevertheless, Bosch agreed to pay a USD 327.5 million settlement for resolving claims of consumers and reseller dealers pending in the Clean Diesel Cases in the U.S. [62] .
Despite the legal consequences for fraudulent conduct, laws, even if made stricter, are unlikely to provide an effective deterrent for fraud. For instance, the European Regulations on Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemical Substances (REACH) prohibits the international trade of products that do not comply with the European Union's laws for protecting human health and the environment [63] . Fines for violating REACH regulations can go up to EUR 22 million with imprisonment for major federal offenses [64] . Nevertheless, each year numerous companies have been found to market products that do not comply with the regulations. For example, Rotosonic Super Glue was found to contain chloroform (24.3% weight) [65] , and leather handbags were found to contain chromium (VI) (13.6 mg/kg) [66], both of which can severely harm the environment as well as consumers.
Consumers in the U.S. are primarily protected by the 15th U.S. Code Subchapter I, titled as the ''Federal Trade Commission''. §45(a)(1) of the code prohibits the use of unfair methods, and deceptive acts and practices affecting commerce. These acts and practices may also include foreign commerce activities that have potential to cause injury within the U.S. The 15 U.S. Code §52(a)(1) also claims unlawful the dissemination of false advertisements to induce the purchase of products and services. The penalties for these false advertisements are imposed by the 15 U.S. Code §54(a), which may include a fine of USD 5,000, and/or imprisonment of not more than 6 months for the first breach, and a fine of up to USD 10,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than a year for a second breach. In addition, each state in the U.S. has also enacted consumer protection statutes, commonly (often collectively) referred to as the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAPs) Statutes. However, these statutes vary greatly from state to state, and significant gaps and weaknesses in the UDAPs undermine the protection they ought to provide to consumers.
In practice, fraud constitutes a criminal act when the government identifies the conduct as such by statute or ordinance -usually in circumstances when the prohibited conduct affects public safety and health, when large numbers of the public are affected, or when the government is directly affected (e.g., military sector). In the U.S., the government pursues the federal False Claims Act (FCA), also known as the ''Lincoln Law'', which was enacted by Congress during the Civil War in 1863 to deter fraud against the federal government by suppliers to the Union Army [67] . From 1986 to 2015, the federal government has recovered USD 48 billion from cases filed under the FCA. The act includes a provision known as the ''qui tam'', which allows any person or entity (referred to as ''relators'') to file an FCA case on behalf of the government. In fact, half of the government's recovered money comes from lawsuits brought by entities other than the government, mainly relators [68] .
The success that followed the FCA suggests that governmental protection for individual purchases can be helpful in providing some measure of consumer protection. Given that a legal structure allowing consumers to get relief from fraud is much needed, the government should work on providing an infrastructure to support customers beyond the scope of federal interests (e.g., avoid forcing individuals to go to arbitration, reduce barriers to obtaining class actions, avoid gag orders on discussing settlements, and allow public interest groups to be party to legal actions). The government should level the playing field between individual consumers and corporations. It should also allocate necessary funds, requisite authority to the regulating and inspecting agencies, and actively track the performance of manufacturers based on customers' complaints.
Additionally, the government must ensure that consumers are aware of their rights and the legal course of action they can pursue had they been victims of fraud. An increase in the cases reported and the consequent litigation can discourage companies from committing fraud. Clients partnering with public interest organizations that monitor corporate wrongdoers could help uncover companies' fraud earlier. Kobe's facilities would not have falsified data for over 10 years had they been caught sooner. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) provides guidance in filing complaints against companies [69] . Practically all the complaints reported to the CFPB pertain to loan, mortgage, and credit card fraud. Federal and/or state governments need to create structures to encourage consumers to report fraud related to products, too, and not just services.
The incompetent prosecution of business fraud and other white-collar crimes is another issue that needs to be addressed by governments. White-collar crime prosecutions have decreased by 31.6% over the past five years, but such statistics do not represent the effective number of white-collar crime incidents, many of which go undetected or unreported [70] . Additionally, prosecutions do not invariably result in conviction. Court cases often result in settlements with no admission of wrongdoing. Individuals responsible for decision-making are rarely punished personally. Officials can be fired, or can resign on their own, but they are rarely jailed for their actions. Numerous laws are enacted for dealing with fraud, but companies manage to bypass the punishments, presenting a contagious example of treachery to others. This must change to hold companies liable for breaching the law.
One way of achieving this could be by publishing fraudulent activities in widely circulated journals and online databases, with worldwide alerts to companies and consumers. Such disclosures directly target a company's reputation, and can be more detrimental to a company's finances than fines and settlements. Given the cost-driven motives of the companies, the prospect of losing clients and market shares can become a determent for fraud. For instance, the BOMcheck project, which was launched in 2008 by Siemens, Philips, and GE Heathcare, is an online database tailored for all suppliers to stay up to date with new RoHS substance regulations around the world. It was launched as an enforcement action to prevent non-compliant substances from being integrated into equipment ranging from electronics to industrial devices, medical products, and even mechanical tools such as hammers [71] . Since then, the withdrawal rate of non-compliant products from the market has significantly improved. If extrapolated to fraud, such databases can also provide customers with historical accounts of suppliers' fraudulent activities.
Customers are also responsible for ensuring a business relationship that has sufficient agreements to support the recovery of adequate damages when a fraudulent incident occurs. In many -if not most -contracts involving OEMs and CMs, as well as their suppliers, the currently accepted norm is to exclude the right of parties to seek penalties for indirect or resulting damages, such as damage to reputation or costs of recall efforts. The contracts are also void of the purchaser's right to inspect the products before shipping, to reject lots when needed, and to gain access to the company's test records. These contracts often contain arbitration clauses that seek to constrain the arbitrator's authority to award punitive damages, which are designed to punish and make an example of the party engaging in fraud. Punitive damages in the U.S. are generally awarded for an independent tort that is committed in a contractual setting, rather than for a breach of contract [72] . In appropriate circumstances, awarding such exemplary damages would serve not only to punish the wrongdoer, but also to send a warning signal to others who may be tempted to commit fraud.
It is in the customer's interest to conduct a thorough product inspection prior to its integration into a system. Construction analysis consists of a customized sequence of analytical techniques used to assess the design and reliability of a component or assembly. Although this technique was developed to assess commercial electronic components, it can be applied to any manufactured product. Some construction analysis steps involve external visual inspection, X-ray inspection, acoustic microscopy, decapsulation, scanning electron microscopy (SEM), and more. In certain cases, some of the construction analysis steps can be destructive, meaning that they will render the part unusable after the test. The choice of test steps, number of samples considered, and acceptability threshold depend on the nature of the product and its intended usage [73] . Such techniques do not immediately prevent companies from practicing fraud, but encourage them to be more careful when providing a product, knowing that the customer will be verifying it against its specifications. Customers nowadays need to balance the economic practicality of verifying the data and products they receive with each purchase against the adverse consequences of using and further distributing fraudulent products.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Fraud has infiltrated every element of the world's global economy, and by many of the once well-known and trusted companies. Today, industries spanning every possible field are susceptible to committing and be perpetrated by fraudulent activities. This paper presents case studies from which three major classes of reasons for fraud were identified; cost reduction programs, technical challenges, and competitive pressures. These reasons often work together and thus may not be separable in all cases. Irrespective of the adopted means and direct motives channeling companies' behavior, we found that the essence of any decision taken by the companies in the context of fraud lies in cost.
Fraud is unacceptable even if a fraudulent product proves not to be detrimental to a consumer's safety. Customers expect to receive a product with the advertised specifications, and any deviations must be the suppliers' responsibility. Customers and end users must be aware that fraud can occur at any time, with any product, by any company. The training of individuals, the responsibility taken by corporate leaders, and the legal penalties have all been inadequate at stopping fraud committed by even some of the world's leading companies. The approaches proposed in this paper are preventative rather than corrective. More focused and specific case studies can provide insights on a more detailed level.
It is unfortunate that our key recommendation is to not trust anyone in the supply chain. Analyzing the market's structure and modeling the supply chain within a specific industry can provide insights into the dynamics of fraud, help identify weak points and provide predictions, but the risk of fraud can be so enormous, that we cannot make assumptions concerning the integrity of a company based on their name or even past history.
